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Seized by Sleaze: The Siege of Corruption and a 
Search for Workable Options in Nigeria 
  
 Nigeria is a country born in hope and optimism, but one that has lived with anxiety for 
most of its fifty-four year history. The anxiety stems from the failure of successive leaders to 
nation-build, and those leaders inability to mobilize the country towards economic, social, and 
political development. In Nigeria, the political class has reduced governance to a veritable 
mechanism that boosts and consolidates their economic strength and fortune to the detriment of 
the country’s economic growth and development. The annual budgets in Nigeria are proverbial 
buffets for the rulers, who have turned corruption into a trademark for governance in the country. 
The scale of corruption occurring in the corridors of power led to the creation of anti-corruption 
agencies, such as the EFCC (Economic and Financial Crime Commission), and the ICPC 
(Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission). However, these 
agencies have made almost no headway fighting corruption. The culture of corrupt enrichment, 
the kleptomaniac tendencies and orchestrated thievery among the political office holders have 
rendered the national economy comatose.
1
 Positions of authority are a means of siphoning, 
sharing, and manipulating the less privileged and down-trodden. Yet, what is indisputable is the 
fact that “no nation is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit its economy to enrich 
themselves.”
2
 Corruption, generally defined as abuse of authority for private gain, is among the 
world’s oldest practices and a fundamental cause of insecurity, providing a focal point for many 
social groups’ grievances against governments.
3
 In the 2013 Global Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) published by Transparency International, Nigeria was ranked as the 36th most corrupt 
country in the world. Nigeria placed 143rd of the 176 countries assessed, scoring 27 percent. The 
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 In light of the above, it could be argued that the basic problem with Nigerian governance 
is its high level of corruption and its attendant poor governance. With a ranking of 143 in the 
2013 Corruption Perception Index, Nigeria is depicted as one of the most corrupt nations in the 
world. The paper will serialize all the ills of corruption in Nigerian governance and the extent to 
which it undermines all the possibilities of national development and progress. With high level 
corruption, it is impossible to have good governance; without good governance, there will be no 
development; without development there cannot be peace; and without peace there will be no 
security. This paper also sets out to review the approaches to corruption prevention and to 
discuss some of the practical difficulties in minimizing the level of corruption in governance 
before making suggestions on options for tackling the menace in Nigeria. But in discussing 
corruption in Nigeria, some pertinent questions arise. For example, what nature does corruption 
assume in this country? What are the causes of corruption in governance in Nigeria? The 
importance of these questions lies in their analytic and normative consequences. Analytically, 
there is little hope of discerning how Nigeria’s corruption in governance will end if its 
emergence and driving factors are not well understood. From a normative perspective, the task of 
prescribing solutions is at worst ad hoc, and at best merely palliative, without a proper diagnosis 
of the causes of corruption in governance. In the final analysis, this paper will examine how 
ending Nigeria’s corruption will only promote genuine peace and stability. 
Conceptual Framework of Corruption 
 Corruption is neither race-bound nor nation-specific. It is a universal phenomenon. 
However, its universality is not an excuse. Corruption is a complex socio-political phenomenon, 
a child of the society and social relations in which it occurs. In a way, the definitional complexity 
is deeply rooted. The complexity owes partly to the fact that ascription of corruption involves 
2
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both a descriptive and a normative judgment, and these judgments work in tandem all the way 
down to the root sense, that the political order may be subject to subversion or systematic 
distortion. As a result, we are not likely to find a universally agreed upon definition of 
corruption. What is needed is to identify the major elements of corruption, which could then be 
combined into a working definition – one that sketches a core concept while acknowledging that 
cases without all the core features may nonetheless count as corruption.  
 The key elements to consider when defining corruption include: a conception of political 
office with rules and norms for the conduct of that office–the office being defined partly in terms 
of the broader public interest that it serves, which may run against the personal interest of the 
political office holder or against interest that are deemed illegitimate but are not strictly personal; 
a view that corruption involves the distortion or subversion of the exercise of political office so 
that  private, partisan, or sectional rather than public interest are the focus; and the idea that three 
actors are normally involved in or affected by corrupt activity. Those three actors are the 
occupant of the political office (A); the intended beneficiary of that political public office (B); 
and the actual beneficiary of the particular exercise of that political public office (C). This triadic 
relation does not always hold. In kleptocracy, for example, A and C are the same. However, with 
administrative payments B and C may be identical, but the identification of three distinct roles – 
the occupants of political public office, the intended beneficiary and the actual beneficiary, 
encourage us to distinguish theft or fraud from corruption, and helps capture how corruption 
distorts the exercise of political public office and power. Combining these elements in a suitably 
tentative definition will produce the following scenario:
5
 Corruption in politics occurs where a 
political public official (A), acting in ways that violate the rules and norms of office and that 
involve personal, partisan or sectional gain, harms the interest of the public (B) (or some sub-part 
3
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there-of) who is the designated beneficiary of that office, to benefit themselves and/ or a third 
party (C) who rewards or otherwise incentivizes A to gain access to goods or services they would 
otherwise obtain. The definition does not assume that A’s behavior must necessarily break the 
law. Legal definitions of corruption can fail to capture some of the worst cases of corrupt 
activities because corrupt transactions can be institutionalized in the laws of the state or 
economy. This was recognized in a 2006 work by the World Bank on ‘state capture,’ which 
notes that corrupt relations can be used to pass laws that entrench, extend and legitimize corrupt 
gains. Not all corruption is about the corruption of politics. There is also economic corruption, as 
well as corruption in a range of public services, such as health, petroleum, and education. But all 
corruption has the same conceptual structure: a recognition of certain formal responsibilities 
attached to an idea of political office or a position of trust, which imply certain responsibilities 
and constraints on self-interested behavior; the violation of rules and norms concerning the 
exercise of that political office or trust; the harming of one set of interest identified by the rules 
and norms as legitimate, to serve others deemed illegitimate; and the benefitting of those not 
formally entitled to benefits.
6
 
 Corruption occurs where private wealth and public power overlap. It represents the illicit 
use of willingness-to-pay either in cash or kind a form of gratification as decision-making 
criteria. Frequently, bribes induce political officials to take actions that are against the interests 
of their principals, who may be bureaucratic superiors, politically appointed ministers, or 
multiple principals such as the general public. In light of the complexity of the concept of 
corruption, one way to improve the understanding of its consequence for efforts at development 
transformation is to distinguish between the different forms of corruption; first, by contrasting 
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grand and petty corruption; second, by differentiating corruption across sectors; and third, by 
examining different practices considered to be corrupt. 
 One of the most common distinctions made by scholars is between grand and petty 
corruption, at times also referred to as political and administrative corruption,
7
 or as state capture 
and administrative corruption.
8
 Despite the misleading terminology, the grand-petty dichotomy is 
not concerned with the scale of corrupt activity, but rather with the level and manner at which it 
takes place; either at the level of the political leadership, or with the bureaucracy that implements 
and administers policy. While the former has undoubtedly had a greater impact on the practices 
and functioning of the political system because it sustains networks of patronage and distorts the 
laws and procedures of government (rather than just their implementation), it is petty corruption 
that is experienced more directly by the population in its daily interactions with the state. For 
example, petty corruption occurs through favors granted and bribes paid regularly by the citizens 
to political public officials.
9
 While the impact of these individual acts of corruption on the 
overall development process may be minimal, it undermines citizens’ trust in the state. In this 
sense, the routine nature of petty corruption can destroy the perception of state neutrality. 
 The second pathway to refine the analysis of corruption is to distinguish between 
corruption in different sectors (justice, security, procurement) as they differ in importance 
between different Nigerian states’ institutions. In jurisdictions with substantial natural resources 
such as crude oil, corruption in the regulation of these sectors and the trade in these commodities 
are likely to be the central challenges to national development and progress efforts.
10
 In a country 
with substantial oil resources, such as Nigeria, government procurement and control of publicly-
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 In the Nigerian context, the menace of corruption and the lack of effectiveness of the 
existing institutions to fight corruption prior to 1999 led to the establishment of the ICPC (2000) 
and EFCC Act (2004), as well as the Money Laundering Prohibition Act (2004). These Acts 
made comprehensive provisions to declare the laundering of the proceeds of a crime an illegal 
act. The also provided appropriate penalties and expanded the interpretation of financial 
institutions.  They also provided scope of supervision of regulatory authorities on corrupt 
activities among others. Ironically, it is the EFCC, ICPC, police and the justice systems that are 
demonstrably weak and are also perceived to be among the most corrupt institutions.
12
 
 Corruption in these sectors is particularly problematic as it creates the (often justified) 
perception that some groups or individuals can act with impunity. This limits trust in the state 
and creates a sense of insecurity, thereby undermining national development and progress 
efforts. Additionally, Nigerian judges and prosecutors often display a strong bias in favor of the 
so called “big fish” (i.e. political elites), while ordinary citizens can barely get a fair trial 
(sometimes facing detention without charges), or being sent to prison for committing petty 
crimes. Importantly, the reason for this behavior is often indirectly for financial gain on the part 
of the judges and prosecutors. There is also general perception among elements of the Nigerian 
political elite that the judiciary is simply an instrument to promote the goal of independence. 
The EFCC distinguishes between seven different forms of corruption in Nigeria: fraud, illegal 
political bargains, embezzlement, bribery, favoritism, extortion, and the abuse of discretion.
13
 
The ICPC identifies only three main forms of corruption: bribery, embattlement, and fraud.
14
 
Some scholars identify seven basic forms of corruption from a study of corruption in Nigeria;
15
 
these include commissions for illicit services, unwarranted payment for public services, 
gratuities, string-pulling, levies and tolls, sidelining, and misappropriation. Broadly, these 
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different lists bear all the lineaments of the kinds of practices that constitute corruption, but 
importantly many of them, such as favoritism, the abuse of discretion, or string-pulling can only 
be meaningfully examined and judged in their specific socio-political context. Therefore, 
focusing on different forms of corruption does not avoid the pitfalls of specific societal 
understandings of the concept. It can help, however, to present and analyze the specific cases of 
corruption trends in Nigerian governance [see the Table 1.1 below].  
Table 1.1: High Profile Cases of Corruption Trends in Nigerian Governance [2000-2013] as 
Reported by Tell Magazine, 9 January 2014 pp21-23 
High Profile Cases 2000-2013 
Ayo Fayose, former 
governor, Ekiti State   
Federal High 
Court, Lagos 
Arraigned on 51 state counts. 
Plea already taken but defense 
lawyer keeps filling frivolous 
applications for long 



















Arraigned on 23 state counts. 
Plea already taken but defense 
lawyer challenged court 
jurisdiction. Case stalled at 
High Court while on appeal 
for stay of trial. This is part of 









since 13th  
July 2007 
Saminu Turaki, former 






Arraigned on 32 state counts. 
Plea already taken but defense 
lawyer challenged   court at 
High Court while seeking stay 
of trial at appeal court. It is 
part of usual attempt to 










Orji Uzor Kalu, 
former governor, Abia 
State      
Federal  High 
Court, 
Maitama 
Arraigned on 107 state counts.  
Plea already taken but defense 
lawyer raised preliminary 
objection   against charges. 
Lost at trial court but has gone 
on trial. It is part of usual 














James Ibori, former 
governor, Delta State    
Federal High 
Court,  Asaba 
Arraigned on 170 state counts. 
Defense lawyer challenged 
Kaduna Federal Court 
jurisdiction, lost at trial court 
but won at appeal court. Case 
reassigned by CJ to Asaba 
FHC. Without taking plea, 
suspect applied to quash 
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judge quash the charges. 
Dec.19.  EFCC filed appeal 
Dec.  23, 2009 
Lucky  Igbinedion, 




Arraigned on 191 state counts. 
Applied for plea bargain and 
convicted but EFCC has 
appealed the judgment to seek 






case filed on 
23rd Jan. 
2008 
Gabriel Aduku, former 
FCT   minister of 




Arraigned on 56 state counts. 
Court judgment:  no case 











Jolly Nyame, former 




Arraigned on 21 state counts. 
Plea already taken but case is 
stalled as defense lawyer 
challenged court jurisdiction. 
Lost at HC, Appeal court, now 
before supreme court. This is a 
typical example of frivolous 

















Arraigned on 105 state counts. 
Plea already taken but case is 
stalled as defense lawyer filed 
to transfer case to another 
judge on allegation of bias 
against trial judge even as 
counsel has filed to challenge 
court jurisdiction. This is 


















Arraigned on 31 state counts, 
plea already taken but trial 
stalled due to suspect’s 














Roland Iyayi, former    







Arraigned on 11 state counts. 
Plea already taken. Trial on 






by Waziri in 
June 2008 







Arraigned on 28 amended 
state counts. Plea already 
taken and trial ongoing. 
Witnesses under cross 
examination Continuation of 







by Waziri in 
June 
2008(Accus




Nyeson Wike, former 
chief of staff to 




Arraigned on state count. 
Court quashed charges. EFCC 
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State High Court, 
Maitama 
Appeal pending at appeal 
court. 
2008(case 
still in court) 
Professor  Babalola 
Borishade,  former 






Arraigned on 11 state counts. 
Plea already taken and trial 
ongoing. Prosecution  


















Arraigned on amended 28 
state counts. Plea taken. 








by Waziri in 
2008 
Femi Fani-Kayode, 




Arraigned on 47 state counts. 
Plea taken but case stalled as a 
result of trial court’s refusal to 
admit e-print of suspect’s 
statement of account as 
evidence.  EFFC on appeal 
against the decision. Matter 




by court in 
2008 
Commenced 
by Waziri in 
2008 (case 






Arraigned on 28 amended 
state counts. Plea taken and 
trial ongoing. Prosecution 
witnesses under cross 
examination. Continuation  







by Waziri in 
2008 
Bode George, 




Arraigned on 68 state counts. 























former governor of 
Oyo State  
Federal High 
Court, Lagos 
Arraigned on 33 state counts. 
Plea taken and trial ongoing 
Prosecution witnesses slated 









serving senator) Hon. 
Ndudi Elumelu, Hon. 
Paulinus Igwe, serving 
members of House of 
Representatives Dr. 
Abdullahi (serving 
fed. perm.sec) Mr. 
Samuel Ibi, Mr. Simon 
Nanle, Mr. Lawrence 
Orekoya, Mr. Kayode 
Oyedeji, Mr. A Garba 
Jahun,(This is the rural 
electrification three 
serving members of 






Plea taken while prosecution 
has filed more charges against 
suspects. Suspects filed to 
quash charges but application 







bail by court 
in 2009 
Commenced 
by Waziri in 
May 2009 
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Representatives, the 
permanent secretary of 
the ministry of power 
and other high profile 
public officers) 
Prof. Bridget Sokan, 
Molkat Mutfwang, 





is the UBEC case 
where high profile 
public servants 
connived with an 
American, Alexander 
Cozman) to defraud 
government. Dr. 
Ransome Owan, Mr. 
Abdulrahman Ado, 
Mr. Abdulrasak Alimi, 
Mr. Onwuamaeze 
Iloeje, Mrs. Grace 
Eyoma, Mr. 
Mohammed Bunu, Mr. 
Abimbola Odubiyi 
(This is the Nigeria 
Electricity Regulatory 
Commission case 
where the chairman 
































High Court 5, 
Jalingo 
Arraigned on 64 state 
counts. Plea taken while 
more charges were filed 
against suspects due to 
appearance of Prof. Sokan. 
Matter adjourned to Nov 9 
for suspects to take plea on 
amended charges. 
 
Arraigned on 196 state 
counts. Plea taken. Trial 
billed to commence while 
more charges were filed 
against suspects. Further  
hearing slated for Oct 29 
Tom Iseghohi, Muhammed 
Buba, Mike Okoli,(GM and 





Arraigned on 37 state 
counts. Plea taken and 

















































































Dr. Cecilia Ibru 






Arraigned on 25 state 
counts. Plea taken and case 

























Arraigned on 26 counts. Plea 
taken. Suspect challenged 
charges but court upheld 

























Arraigned on 149 court 
charges. Suspect granted bail 




















































 It should be noted from Table 1.1 that in all these cases of corruption none of the culprits 
is currently detained or serving a jail term apart from James Ibori, the former governor of Delta 
State, who is currently serving a jail term in the United Kingdom. This is a clear indication of the 
failure of the Nigerian judiciary to prosecute politicians and ex-public officials. Even Ayo 
Fayose, who is a chief culprit on the list, has recently been reelected as the governor of Ekiti 
State. The inclusion of one of the most corrupt political office holders, Mr. Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha, in the ongoing national conference plays down the seriousness of the 
government in fighting corruption in high places. Given these two scenarios, where offenders are 
not held accountable for their corrupt crimes, and are in fact rewarded with political 
appointments, corruption in Nigerian governance can therefore be described without too much 
hyperbole as a viper draining the blood of the Nigerian state. Also, in a situation where political 
elites have been prosecuted and jailed, they are usually given a light jail term, and granted 
amnesty prior to completing their terms in jail. 
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Governance and Corruption 
 A number of Nigerian laws pertaining to corruption reflect good practice, but inconsistent 
and weak implementation, and as a consequence lack of positive results, and have led to a 
continuous decrease in political public trust in the country’s institutions. The analysis of 
corruption trends shows that it is pervasive among the government authorities or officials.
16
 This 
is unsurprising, given that contact between citizens and public administration mostly takes place 
at the government level, while the price of corruption is certain to rise at higher levels of power. 
In most cases, the incriminating trail of activities, such as the misappropriation of public funds, 
the mismanagement of public companies, and irregularities in the privatization process are 
manifestations of official recklessness and corruption in high places. This leads to the conclusion 
that most of the criminal activities could not happen without the direct engagement, approval, or 
patronage of high ranking government officials.
17
 
 From the perspective of those concerned with transparency and accountability, it is 
disturbing that the key positions in the privatization and regulatory agencies and on the managing 
boards of public enterprises are held by persons whose most important qualification is their 
membership in the right political party. It is little wonder then that the public perceives the 
political parties as the most corrupt segment of the society, and fault them for introducing fraud, 
theft, cronyism and other corrupt behavior into executive and legislative institutions, as well as 




 Another issue worth noting is the lack of a multi-stakeholder approach to fighting 
corruption. Most efforts have concentrated on strengthening individual institutions and have very 
rarely taken a holistic, countrywide approach that brings key parties together to discuss agendas 
12
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and priorities. A good example of this type of failure is judicial reform in Nigeria.
19
 
Strengthening the judiciary without implementing simultaneous and integrated measures in the 
police, the prosecution services, the public attorney’s office, and the legal professions will not 
bring about any improvement in Nigeria. While progress has been made in professionalizing the 
judiciary, the police and other institutions of the legal system, a lack of communication and 
cooperation between these institutions has prevented substantive systemic change.  
 It has been almost fourteen years since the end of military rule and a return of democratic 
order in Nigeria, yet there have been few serious prosecutions of corruption offences by the 
judiciary, or of economic crimes committed during President Olusegun Obasanjo administration 
or after. This highlights how the current decentralized and uncoordinated system is unsustainable 
in the long-term, and vulnerable to political influence.
20
 The anti-corruption agencies (EFCC, 
ICPC and Judiciary system) have been unsuccessful due to a lack of commitment, the lack of 
cooperation between the principal agencies, and the lack of political will to combat corruption. In 
Nigeria, politicians continue to maintain non-transparent, semi-autonomous, feudal domains and 
rely on networks supported by financial and economic resources at their disposal. Until these 
change, the public sector will remain unable to effectively address Nigeria’s governance and 
corruption problems. The apparatus of orderly government is too often hijacked by political 
elites who siphon proceeds from the national treasury and transform government bureaucracies 
into bribe-collection agencies which impede business.
21
 
 A slow process of using the proceeds of property transformation to drive capacity 
building has left state-owned capital languishing, still ruled by an economic policy characterized 
by nepotism and cronyism. A large share of public expenditures remains outside the budget 
(including the road directorates and the power companies). Economic and political observers are 
13
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inclined to cavil at the lack of national and developmental progress in the privatization strategy, 
particularly in the federation, as undermining the country’s health. Given that it is                  
time-consuming to address key transition challenges and that much valuable time has already 
been lost, any further delay in systemic anti-corruption efforts may threaten the expected reform 
processes with far-reaching consequences, such as increasing rate of corruption and arrested 
development. More worrisome is the privatization of large, strategically important companies 
which has been characterized by a lack of transparency and failure to follow legal prescribed 
procedures.
22
 In 2012, Transparency International Nigeria raised the issue of illegal privatization 
of the Niger-Delta oil refinery and the electric power plant; both operations resemble more 
closely a money laundering operation than respectable Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
23
 Such 
an environment deters much-needed foreign investments and makes domestic investments less 
appealing and profitable. 
 Corruption in governance has created an atmosphere of ambiguity that stymies investors 
from investing and initiating new operation in the Nigerian economy, assuming the rule of law is 
a prerequisite for investment and pervasive corruption has long term consequences on 
investment, which is the fulcrum upon which a country’s economic development and progress is 
erected. Corruption has also played a key role in driving foreign investments away, as some 
foreign companies have refused to set up operations after demands from the officials to pay 
bribes and do business exclusively with local party officials.
24
 Nigeria thus remains one of the 
very few countries where production industries were discouraged from entering.
25
 Until 2010, 
Nigeria maintained the lowest regional FDI figures, with only a slight improvement since then. 
Administrative barriers are numerous. The country has the highest costs for setting up business 
14
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and among the highest social and fiscal corruptions. These barriers serve as discouragement for 
for investors and thus impact negatively on the quest for development.
26
 
Causes of Corruption and Poor Governance 
 Given the scale of corruption and poor governance in Nigeria, economic and political 
reformers need to isolate the causes of these phenomena. Recognizing trends in Nigerian 
corruption helps pinpoint the underlying causes of corruption and poor governance. It seems 
possible to conclude, first, that poor governance contributes to low growth and that weak 
institutions facilitate corruption.  While Bassey found out that trade openness and transparency 
reduce corruption, and that countries with fewer rents to share are less corrupt, Akindele and 
Adeyemi locate the problem with Nigeria’s inability to secure appreciable foreign investment in 
weak law enforcement, insecurity of property rights.  
 Historical and social factors help explain Nigerian differences on unity and progress. For 
example, Salul and Aremu used the mortality rates of European settlers as a gauge for the type of 
colonial regime put in place by the colonial powers and find that it does a good job predicting 
expropriation risk (and corruption levels in governance) at the end of the twentieth century.
27
 
Taylor considers legal origin, religion, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, latitude and per capita 
income as determinant of a range of features of economic, social and political life.
28
 
More so, colonial heritage, legal tradition, religion and geographical factors seem to be 
associated with corruption in Nigerian governance and other measures of government 
dysfunction, but these are not policy variables that can easily be tampered with by economic and 
political reformers in Nigeria. The key issue is whether these historical regularities directly affect 
Nigerian government quality or whether they help determine intermediate Nigerian government 
institutions and attitudes that present day policies can affect. Amundsen contends that historical 
15
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variables are not always significant, and may even be entirely insignificant if income and latitude 
are taken into account.
29
 
 These historical patterns may operate through their impact on underlying Nigerian 
government institutional structures, not as direct determinants of corruption in Nigerian 
governance. If so, that may be good news for Nigerian economic and political reformers in 
development and transformation settings who seek to create new institutions that facilitate 
economic growth and high income.
30
 However, the issue is not really the absence of an 
institutional framework; rather, the major problem is the adulteration of these institutions.  
Latitudes and history need not be destiny especially if an economic and political situation has 
created a space for the creation of new institutional framework in Nigerian governance. Less 
optimistically, the destruction of government economic transformation institutions can open the 
way of old ethnic, tribal, and religious rivalries to flare up. 
 Within the universe of democracies, features of government structure, such as 
presidentialism, closed-list proportional representation, and federalism facilitate corruption.
31
 
Presidential systems that use proportional representations to elect their legislatures are more 
corrupt, especially in Africa. Many parliamentary democracies that elect legislatures by plurality 
rule have a heritage of British colonial rule and many proportional representations systems had 
French governments. Present day levels of political freedom also have historical roots. However, 
if constitutional reform, protection of rights, women’s rights, and electoral institutions are 
important determinants in and of themselves, then Nigeria has policy levers available even if 
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Assessing the Consequences of Corruption in Nigeria 
 Contemporary empirical work started with the development of countries indices 
measuring the perception of corruption. The most widely used are compiled by anti-corruption 
NGO Transparency International. Developed countries have, on average, high growth rates, 
fewer reported corruption cases, and better functioning governments.
32
 However, it is unclear 
whether a low level of income and growth are the cause of corruption in Nigeria. Most likely, the 
casual arrow runs both ways creating vicious and virtuous of corruption. A high level of 
corruption is associated with a lower level of investment and growth, and corruption discourages 
both capital inflows and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria.  
 Thus, corruption in Nigerian governance lowers productivity, reduces the effectiveness of 
industrial policies and encourages business companies to operate in the unofficial sector in 
violation of tax and regulatory laws. According to Usman, if a country such as Nigeria could 
achieve the corruption score of the United Kingdom, its GDP would increase by more than 20 
percent and net annual per capita capital inflows would increase by 5 percent.
33
 Highly corrupt 
countries like Nigeria tend to under-invest in human capital by spending less on education, to 
over-invest in public infrastructure relative to private investment, and to have lower levels of 
environmental quality.
34
 High levels of corruption in Nigerian governance produce a more 
unequal distribution of income and can also undermine the programs designed to help the poor in 
Nigeria. As a result, the government loses legitimacy in the eyes of its people.
35
 The venality of 
public officials in Nigeria leads to frustration and despondency on the part of the citizenry, and 
contribute to the spiraling of violence and anti-government riots in the country. For example, the 
riots inspired by the fuel subsidy removal that occurred on January 1, 2012 reflected this lack of 




Bamidele et al.: Seized by Sleaze
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository, 2015
 
 Political supporters of the corrupt incumbent government, not surprisingly, express more 
positive views of that government. Presumably, this difference depends upon the individualized 
benefits that flow to these political supporters. A survey carried out in the country between 1999 
and 2012 shows that those exposed to corruption had both lower levels of belief in the political 
system and lower levels of interpersonal trust.
37
 In the survey, the Nigerian respondents were 
asked if the payment of bribes facilitate getting things done in the bureaucracy. Interestingly, 
those who agreed that corruption gets things done were the same who were highly likely to 
believe in the legitimacy of the political system in place in 2012.
38
 
 When there is low government legitimacy, citizens try to avoid taxes and firms go 
underground to hide from the burden of bureaucracy, including attempt to solicit bribes. Using 
data from Transparency International, Lawal and Oladunjoye show that high levels of perceived 
corruption are associated with high levels of tax evasion in the country. Their survey data 
regarding Nigeria shows that those who belief that an individual is obligated to pay taxes have 
more trust in government.
39
 Similarly, Mauro’s study of attitudes toward tax evasion in Nigeria 
shows that when individuals perceive that corruption is high, they are less likely to say that 
people have an obligation to pay taxes.
40
 Thus, one indirect impact of corruption is that it creates 
the impression that it is acceptable not to pay taxes because the government is administered by 
corrupt officials.  
 Another consequence of corruption is that it can precipitate armed conflict. To the extent 
that economic variables, such as the level, structure, and growth of income influence the risk of 
armed conflict, corruption can undermine national development and progress in the country.
41
 
Corruption often plays a major role in informal economic and political activities, having negative 
effects on public revenue, economic formalization, and the protection of workers and the 
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environment. Yet any attempt of tackling corruption in governance by formalizing the economy 
should consider the social consequences and the possible impact on the conflict, since informal 
economic and political activities support social livelihood and act as a valuable ‘social pressure 
valve.’ In a country like Nigeria, formalization and legalization of the economy would do more 
harm than good. In addition, another political consequence of corruption maybe the 
entrenchment of an imbalance of power or the political status quo inherited from the conflict. As 
groups empowered by the outcome of violence continue to sustain dormant economic and 
political positions through corruption, they prevent the redistribution of power by stifling 
institutional checks and balances. At the extreme, donors will end up dealing with political 
criminals as official interlocutors; a situation that has been avoided in some cases in Nigeria by 




 Much has been made of the importance of moral leadership from the top, but this is not 
sufficient. Too much moralizing risks degenerating into empty rhetoric – or worse, witch hunts 
against political opponents. Policy must address the underlying conditions that create incentives 
for corruption, or it will have no long-lasting effects. Some scholars argue that the remedy for 
corruption in Nigeria is economic growth and that economic growth is furthered by good policies 
promulgated by a good government, especially through the promotion of education.
43
 However, 
that claim reflects an overly simplistic view of the roots of both economic growth and corruption. 
In the Nigerian situation, policy recommendations that concentrate only on macro-economic 
aggregates can hardly be effective in engendering economic growth. No growth can occur unless 
institutions are restored to at least a minimal level of competency. Corruption is a symptom that 
indicates the dysfunctional level of the state-society relations, which undermines the legitimacy 
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of the state and lead to wasteful public policies. Good policies are unlikely to be chosen or to be 
carried out effectively without honest institutions. The ordinary options for institutional reform 
fall into several broad categories: programme redesign, policies that increase transparency and 
accountability, and, in severe cases, constitutional change. These will be needed for national 
development and progress in Nigeria, but sometimes they will not be sufficient or even possible, 
due to the level of political instability and weaknesses of state institutions. Therefore, this paper 
seeks to offer some recommendations that are more directly targeted at development situations. 
The first line of policy response needed is the redesign of programs to limit the underlying 
incentives for payoffs. This might mean eliminating highly corrupt programs, but, of course, the 
state cannot abandon its responsibilities in many areas where corruption is pervasive. One 
response might be to limit official discretion by, for example, streamlining and simplifying 
regulations, expanding the supply of benefits, making eligibility criteria clear, introducing legal 
payments for services, giving officials overlapping jurisdictions to give citizens choices, or 
redesigning systems to limit delays. Political reformers should consider if cleanups in one area 
will just shift corruption to another sector of the government. Programs may need to be 
comprehensive to have any impact. In addition, service delivery can be improved by civil service 
reforms that provide better salaries, improved monitoring, and the use of incentives.
44
 
 The second collection of reform strategies focuses on the accountability and transparency 
of government actions. For example, a freedom-of-information law can give citizens access to 
government information, and many government decision-making processes should be open to 
public scrutiny and participation. Open government also depends on rigorous and free media that 
can perform a watchdog function. Other options to improve accountability include the creation of 
independent oversight agencies and the use of external and internal benchmarks. Ongoing 
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experiments with grassroots democracy need more study to determine their impact and their 
transferability to other contexts.
45
 
 Third, Nigeria may need to consider more radical economic and political reforms in the 
government structure. Democracy is valuable for many reasons, but, taken by itself, is hardly an 
antidote for corruption. Some evidence suggests that presidential systems, above all those using 
proportional representation in the legislature, may be especially corrupt.
46
 Furthermore, elections 
are not always effective and sufficient. The state must protect civil liberties and establish the rule 
of law. Rules must be clear and fair and be administered competently and fairly. This entails 
having an honest, professional, and independent judiciary, and police and prosecutors who have 
integrity and competence. With these conventional reform options as background, what are the 
particular factors that must be considered in the Nigerian polity? What can international bodies 
do to help create a window of opportunity for reform? Admittedly, each case is different, but 
here are some general suggestions.  
 Anti-corruption and government reform efforts can either set the stage for more reforms 
or destabilize a fragile equilibrium.
47
 Thus, policymakers may be needed to create a space in 
which reform can occur. They can only do this, however, if (a) they have the resources to operate 
effectively, (b) pick their fights carefully to achieve some early and visible victories and to fit 
reform programs to the capacities of the country, and (c) start simple. For example, ensure that 
primary systems of financial control inside agencies are in place before creating secondary 
bodies such as anti-corruption commissions.
48
 Another necessary step is, (d) not simply pouring 
in funds without clear checks on their use. One option for experts is to use trust funds administer 
aid programs with ultimate goal of turning over programs to government. Other elements 
include, (e) create bodies both inside government agencies but independent of the executive for 
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the administration of a freedom of information law, to audit and monitor government spending, 
etc., and (f) strengthen the independence of prosecutors and courts. International technical 
assistance can help in programs such as the creation of internal financial controls and 
independent agencies, the development of methods to incorporate public input, or the training of 
government personnel or media. There is also a need for, (g) stressing the creation of systems to 
monitor public spending and policymaking in general, not just to control the disbursement of aid 
funds. These institutions are especially important in states, such as Nigeria, where political party 
competition is weak. A careful examination of corruption in Nigeria evinces how the overlap of 
state and party limits accountability and undermines both nominally independent public bodies, 
such as the judiciary and the institutions for the control of corruption.
49
 Another example is the 
control of fuel subsidies in Nigeria. Losses of 53 percent of the total were controlled by hiring an 
independent auditor to deliver the funds to local marketers. This apparently cut loses but was 




 A more systematic study of interventions by the federal government is needed to see what 
works and what does not, including the gathering of baseline data so that donors can track 
programs as they develop and document progress and setbacks. The federal government should 
also work to develop stronger anti-corruption controls on money laundering at the state level in 
order to make it more difficult for corrupt officials to export their gains. In addition, the focus on 
strengthening anti-corruption institutions is rooted in the idea that weak formal institutions fuel 
corruption. However, as the Nigerian case has shown, corruption is also the consequence of 
concomitant informal power structures that fuel and shape corruption. Such efforts to strengthen 
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formal institutions are rarely accompanied by similar efforts to weaken or co-opt these informal 
structures, limiting the impact of anti-corruption reforms, as highlighted in Nigeria.
51
    
Conclusion 
 This paper has demonstrated that despite experimentation with various political 
government institutions and anti-corruption campaigns, nothing has succeeded in reducing or 
eliminating corruption in Nigeria. Given this, this paper concludes with two instructive ideas. 
First, corruption is a political problem, and hence requires a political solution. Second, a 
technical approach will not succeed on its own. In practice, this means that establishing anti-
corruption institutions and passing reforms are unlikely to be effective without real political 
support from the government – no matter how well funded they are or how well designed the 
anti-corruption programs. Corruption is difficult to tackle because there are underlining structural 
issues that make it a rational strategy in several societies. In the Nigerian governance context, the 
approach that is most likely to achieve long-term success is to embed anti-corruption reforms 
within efforts to create legitimate political institution. Ideally, these two agendas should be seen 
as complementary. Studies have found out that accountability is one of the basic elements of 
good governance. In wise, good governance is the dependent variable that requires selfless 
leadership, openness and free media to flourish. Apart from enhancing legitimacy, good 
governance promotes the economy by attracting investments and by so doing triggers 
productivity. The net effect of good governance is therefore reduction in corruption and 
improvement in socioeconomic development. In essence therefore, good governance offers the 
best way for Nigeria to combat the scourge of corruption.  
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